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   When Things Went Terribly, Terribly Wrong Part II 
Steven L. Winter* 
Looking back in 2009 at the wave of neoliberal American consultants that swept 
through Central and Eastern Europe and the concurrent turn to formalism and doctrinal-
ism that seized the academy in the mid-to-late 1990s, I observed that “it would not be en-
tirely wrong” to conclude that “the collapse of the Soviet Union set jurisprudence back a 
century.”1 Mark Lilla’s recent piece in The New Republic mines a similar vein in decry-
ing “the intellectual vacuum” left in the wake of the end of the Cold War.2 
Never since the end of World War II, and perhaps since the Russian Revolution, 
has political thinking in the West been so shallow and clueless. We all sense that 
ominous changes are taking place in our societies, and in other societies whose 
destinies will very much shape our own. Yet we lack adequate concepts or even a 
vocabulary for describing the world we find ourselves in. The connection be-
tween words and things has snapped. The end of ideology has not meant the lift-
ing of clouds. It has brought a fog so thick that we can no longer read what is 
right before us. 
Today, the neoliberal worldview that dominates the West and much of the globe is an 
amalgam of free market fundamentalism (recall the unregulated derivatives that brought 
down the global economy in 2008), global corporatism (think “inversions”), unrestrained 
managerialism (i.e., the Common Core), and atomistic individualism (thus, Obamacare is 
“socialism”). Lilla concludes that ours a “libertarian age.”  
That is not because democracy is on the march (it is regressing in many places), 
or because the bounty of the free market has reached everyone (we have a new 
class of paupers), or because we are now all free to do as we wish (since wishes 
inevitably conflict). No, ours is a libertarian age by default: whatever ideas or be-
liefs or feelings muted the demand for individual autonomy in the past have atro-
phied. There were no public debates on this and no votes were taken. Since the 	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1 Steven L. Winter, “When Things Went Terribly, Terribly Wrong,” in On Philosophy in American Law 36 
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2 Mark Lilla, “The Truth About Our Libertarian Age: Why the dogma of democracy doesn’t always make 
the world better,” The New Republic, June 17, 2014 (available online at http://www.newrepublic.com/ 
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cold war ended we have simply found ourselves in a world in which every 
advance of the principle of freedom in one sphere advances it in the others, 
whether we wish it to or not. The only freedom we are losing is the freedom to 
choose our freedoms. 
This paper considers the connection between this Zeitgeist and the internal sociology of 
knowledge (or ignorance) that characterizes the practice of legal scholarship.  
Legal scholarship has for decades been marked by a repetition compulsion that 
ranges from constant reinvention of the wheel to the occasional—though unaccountably 
rare—eruption of plagiarism scandals at the highest level of the profession. Some ten or 
twelve years ago, I was in Prague on my way to dinner with an old and respected friend. 
As we crossed the Charles Bridge, I was unburdening to him the painful experience of 
having a former colleague and his co-author appropriate as their own my work on the 
metaphorical structure of narratives.3 “Let me tell you what happened to me!” my usually 
unflappable friend interjected. “One of my junior colleagues comes into my office and 
says: ‘I’ve written an article on [topic X]. I know you are an expert on that subject. Could 
you read and comment on my paper?’” As my friend began to read it, he immediately 
recognized the argument as one he had laid out in a recent paper. “My own piece,” he 
exclaimed to me loudly amid the throng of tourists. “He was asking me to comment on 
my own piece!” 
I share this story because it is so extreme as to be unfathomable. It is one thing to 
rip off the work of a lesser known scholar and pass it off as one’s own. But it is quite 
another matter to appropriate the work of a famous author in his field of expertise and 
expect that nobody will notice. That can only happen in a profession which lacks a canon 
common to all students of the field. Only in such a field could one expect that the average 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For detail and documentation, see Steven L. Winter, “Making the Familiar Conventional Again,” 99 
Michigan Law Review 1607 (2001) (hereinafter: “Familiar”). 
	   3	  
reader—whether colleague or law review editor—would fail to notice the obvious ground 
that was being retread. Yet, there are all too many pieces that can only charitably be 
referred to as recycling. 
If plagiarism were the only problem, we might chalk it up to a lack of academic 
integrity or bemoan the status competition that feeds such behavior. (Indeed, if the New 
York Times is to be believed, the problem of plagiarism is especially acute at the highest 
levels of the profession.4) But, as I have previously observed, “[i]t is not just a matter of 
the proprieties of scholarship.”5 Familiarity with and mastery of prior scholarship is 
necessary to the intellectual development of any field of study: 
Prior discussions help clarify and refine issues, identify flawed arguments and 
unpromising lines of inquiry, or reformulate old questions in new and more pro-
ductive ways. A scholar who takes up an area of inquiry without reckoning with 
the existing literature runs the very serious risk of missing the real issues or, at 
the least, reinventing the wheel. Thus, we might say that the first corollary of 
Santayana’s famous dictum is that those who don’t contend with the literature are 
doomed to repeat it.6 
A field marked by the repetition and recycling of a handful of ideas is one mired in an un-
productive, maladaptive stasis. The world does not stand still; law, as any other discipline, 
must address new and more complex challenges. But, it is simply not possible to make 
anything like “progress” in legal thought when those trained in the field are not familiar 
with—and, therefore, cannot build on—the insights of the past. 
While many factors contribute to this state of affairs, one easily remediable factor 
is the lack of a common canon that could serve as a lingua franca for the profession. I 
have (with the input of a few friends) compiled such a list which is appended to this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Sara Rimer, “When Plagiarism’s Shadow Falls on Admired Scholars,” The New York Times, Nov. 24, 
2004, B9.  
5 “Familiar,” supra note 3, at 1614-15. 
6 Id. 
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paper.7 Most of the articles and books on my list can be characterized as classics, though 
I assume that among any group of well-read law professors there will be disagreements 
with respect to both omissions and inclusions. I will be drawing on that list in the balance 
of this paper as I elaborate my claims concerning the problems of legal scholarship. My 
principal point is that, if we lack adequate concepts or a vocabulary for describing and 
dealing with the increasingly complex contemporary world, one reason is that we have 
failed to build on the lessons of our predecessors. 
In his most recent book, Judge Posner complains that neither judges nor law more 
generally deal well with complexity.8 He closes with the rather salient example of “civil 
recourse theory” which maintains that tort law is about “empowering people who have 
been wrongly injured” and rests essentially on common moral intuitions of right and 
wrong.9 The atavism of this “theory” is stunning; as Posner says, “[i]t is not enough to 
say that we all know a wrong when we see one. . . .”10 But, it is all the more astonishing 
when one considers civil recourse theory in light of the sophisticated contributions of 
economic theory from Coase’s pivotal insight that what tort law views as injury and 
injuring behavior are better understood as reciprocal inflictions of social costs,11 through 
Calabresi’s groundbreaking Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts12 (which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For a similar effort, see Martha Minow, “Archetypal Legal Scholarship: A Field Guide,” 63 Journal of 
Legal Education 65 (2013). 
8 Richard A. Posner, Reflections on Judging (Harvard Univ. Press, 2013). 
9 Id. at 359-66 (quoting Professor Zipursky). 
10 Id. at 364. 
11 Ronald H. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” 3 Journal of Law & Economics 1 (1960) (reprinted in 
Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law 95 (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1988)). 
12 Guido Calabresi, “Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,” 70 Yale Law Journal 499 
(1961); see also Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (Yale Univ. Press, 
1970).	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Posner does not cite) focusing on the use of tort law to minimize accidents and accident-
avoidance costs (points he does note), through Posner’s own work on the subject.13 
Posner’s point about the failure of law to deal adequately with complexity is well-
taken, even profound. But his treatment of the issue disappoints because it fails to reckon 
with and build on the existing literature. Posner starts promisingly by defining complex-
ity as a characteristic of systems: “A question is complex when it is difficult by virtue of 
involving complicated interconnections or interactions—in other words, when it is a 
question about a system rather than a monad.”14 He finds most of the academic legal 
literature on complexity unhelpful because of its solipsistic focus on the complexity of 
law.15 (We might, with all intended irony, call this “the internal point of view.”) Posner 
notes three exceptions: two articles from 1997 and Lon Fuller’s classic The Forms and 
Limits of Adjudication,16 which he singles out as “remarkably prescient.”17 But he does 
not discuss any of these pieces, leaving us to guess at their relevance. 
Those familiar with Fuller’s article will share my puzzlement. One would have 
thought that Forms and Limits would be the starting point of any discussion of the law’s 
capacity (or incapacity) for dealing with complexity. Fuller’s principal point, after all, 
was that adjudication is ill-suited to dealing with “polycentric” problems—that is, com-
plex problems involving systemic interconnections that, therefore, are not amenable to 
linear reason. A polycentric problem, Fuller explained, is like a spider web: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (Harvard Univ. Press, 
1987). 
14 Reflections, supra note 8, at 54-55. 
15 Id. at 59 (citing Peter H. Schuck, “Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures,” 42 Duke 
Law Journal 1 (1992) which treats legal complexity in terms of density, technicality, differentiation, and 
indeterminacy).  
16 Lon L. Fuller, “The Forms & Limits of Adjudication,” 92 Harvard Law Review 353 (1978) (originally 
circulated in 1957). 
17 Reflections, supra note 8, 59, n. 8. 
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A pull on one strand will distribute tensions after a complicated pattern through-
out the web as a whole. Doubling the original pull will, in all likelihood, not 
simply double each of the resulting tensions but will rather create a different 
complicated pattern of tensions. This would certainly occur, for example, if the 
doubled pull caused one or more of the weaker strand to snap. This is a “poly-
centric” situation because it is “many centered”—each crossing of strands is a 
distinct center for distributing tensions.18 
Fuller argued that adjudicators confronted with such problems inevitably simplify and 
objectify the issue before them in order to make it suitable for adjudication.19  
When Posner says that Fuller was “prescient,” he means only that Fuller was 
correct in noting that courts do not deal well with systemic complexity. But, Posner and 
Fuller are not—in fact—making the same point. Posner, who now identifies as a legal 
realist,20 argues that courts need to do a better job of dealing with the systemic com-
plexity of contemporary life. Fuller, who was defending the traditional approach to adju-
dication, argued that they cannot and should not. Fuller defined adjudication as “a 
process of decision that grants to the affected party a form of participation that consists in 
the opportunity to present proofs and reasoned argu-ments.”21 He argued that polycentric 
problems are “not appropriate raw material for a process of decision that is institutionally 
committed to acting on the basis of reasoned argument.”22 He concluded that courts 
should not try to solve polycentric problems because the attempt to deal with such com-
plexity inevitably “impairs the integrity of adjudication.”23 Fuller’s point, in other words, 
is in direct conflict with Posner’s. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Fuller, supra note 16, at 395.	  
19 Id. at 401-02. 
20 Reflections, supra note 8, at 5-6, 353. 
21 Fuller, supra note 16, at 369. 
22 Id. at 371. 
23 Id. at 382, 401.	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Instead of engaging with Fuller, Posner proceeds to decry the needless intricacies 
of the Bluebook,24 to disparage the verbosity of formalist judges,25 and to defend the use 
of the Internet to flesh out the record on appeal.26 This is unfortunate. Posner is both a 
proponent of the economic analysis in law and a self-declared pragmatist.27 As such, he is 
uniquely positioned to say something about how law and adjudication might better deal 
with complex social problems. 
So, consider what Posner might have said had he attended to Fuller’s article (and 
some of the subsequent literature that responds to it). He might have pointed out that 
Fuller’s conclusion—that law should not attempt to deal with polycentric problems—is 
wrong on three counts: first, because Fuller limits law and adjudication to an unrealis-
tically formal and unsustainable view of rationality; second, because Fuller’s own argu-
ment concedes that every legal problem is unavoidably polycentric; and, third, because 
the federal courts already possess ample procedural mechanisms for dealing with com-
plexity in adjudication. Consider each point in turn. 
(1) Fuller’s three contrast cases—of social ordering through elections, self-inter-
ested bargaining, and affective relations—are designed to show that only adjudication can 
meet the “burden of rationality” that he himself calls “a too exigent rationality” that “de-
mands an immediate and explicit reason for every step taken.”28 But Fuller’s conception 
of rationality is artificially restrictive. Fuller gives the example of the potato farmer who 
barters his excess with the onion farmer next door. He maintains that  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Reflections, supra note 8, at 96-104. 
25 Id. at 116-20. 
26 Id. at 131-48. 
27 Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 26 (Harvard Univ. Press, 1990); Reflections, supra 
note 8, at 5.	  
28 Fuller, supra note 16, at 366-67, 371.	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there is no test of rationality that can be applied to the result of the trade con-
sidered in abstraction from the interests of the parties. Indeed, the trade of pota-
toes for onions, which is a rational act by one trader, might be consider-
ed irrational if indulged in by his opposite number, who has a storehouse full 
of onions and only a bushel of potatoes. If we asked one party to the contract. 
“Can you defend that contract?” he might answer, “Why, yes. It was good for me 
and it was good for him.” If we then said, “But that is not what we meant. 
We meant, can you defend it on general grounds?” he might well reply that he 
did not know what we were talking about.29 
But this is wrong. The educated farmer would simply say that the trade was Pareto opti-
mal—which surely meets any test of generality, objectivity, and rationality that anyone 
could care to point to.30 
The point, to be clear, is not that economics should be the go-to methodology for 
judges (or any other decisionmaker). I have elsewhere criticized the reductionism of the 
rational actor model precisely because it fails to understand that human beings “are re-
markably complex psychosocial systems.”31 The point, rather, is that Fuller draws a false 
distinction between the rationality of adjudication and the presumed arationalism of other 
aspects of social life that supposedly rely on emotivism, self-interest, or intuition.32 And 
this mistake, in turn, leads him to an absurdly narrow view of legal reason as defined by 
principles supporting claims of right and accusations of guilt.33 The consequence is a 
view of adjudication that would preclude it from harnessing modes of analysis—in-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Id.  
30 Cf. Jan G. Deutsch, “Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law 
and Political Science,” 20 Stanford Law Review 169, 193-95 (1968) (critiquing Herbert Wechsler’s concept 
of “neutral principles”). 
31 Steven L. Winter, “Law, Culture, and Humility,” in Law and Humanities: An Introduction 98, 105 (Cam-
bridge Univ. Press, Austin Sarat, Mathew D. Anderson,  & Catherine O. Frank eds., 2010). Indeed, even 
Posner concedes that “the explanatory power of the rational actor thesis is overstated.” Reflections, supra 
note 8, at ___. 
32 For another counterexample in the context of affective relations, see Steven L. Winter, “Foreword: On 
Building Houses,” 69 Texas Law Review 1595, 1613-19 (1991). 
33 Fuller, supra note 16, at 368-69. To be precise, Fuller argued that this is not an accurate description of 
adjudication, but an implication of its commitment to give all affected parties the opportunity to participate 
through the presentation of reasoned arguments and proofs. Id. (“It is not so much that adjudicators decide 
only issues presented by claims of right or accusations. The point is rather that whatever they decide, or 
whatever is submitted to them for decision, tends to be converted into a claim of right or an accusation of 
fault or guilt.”). 
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cluding economics (despite its shortcomings)—that offer more sophisticated tools for 
thinking about systems and social complexity. 
(2) Fuller’s bottom-line is that polycentric problems are not suitable for adjudica-
tion. Yet, he effectively concedes that all legal problems are polycentric. Fuller gives the 
example of a negligence case involving a railroad crossing: 
A decision may act as a precedent, often an awkward one, in some situation not 
foreseen by the arbiter. Again, suppose a court in a suit between one litigant and 
a railway holds that it is an act of negligence for the railway not to construct an 
underpass at a particular crossing. There may be nothing to distinguish this cros-
sing from other crossings on the line. As a matter of statistical probability it may 
be clear that constructing underpasses along the whole line would cost more lives 
(through accidents in blasting, for example) than would be lost if the only safety 
measure were the familiar “Stop, Look & Listen” sign. If so, then, what seems 
to be a decision simply declaring the rights and duties of two parties is in fact an 
inept solution for a polycentric problem, some elements of which cannot be 
brought before the court in a simple suit by one injured party against a defend- 
ant railway. In lesser measure, concealed polycentric elements are probably pre- 
sent in almost all problems resolved by adjudication.34 
The first thing to note about this passage is that Fuller only needed to introduce 
the concept of precedent to convert a perfectly ordinary tort hypothetical into a poly-
centric problem. For, once one acknowledges the effect of precedent, every case becomes 
polycentric in a sense fatal to Fuller’s argument: Every decision will necessarily affect 
future parties not present before the court and, thus, unable to participate through rea-
soned arguments and proofs. True, those absent parties may in the next case seek to have 
the precedent overturned. But they will already be handicapped by an adverse ruling 
which has established the principle that governs the admissibility and effects of their rea-
soned arguments and proofs.35 And, in seeking to overturn that principle, they will neces-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Id. at 397-98.	  
35 Cf. Louis Henkin, “The Supreme Court, 1967 Term—Foreword: On Drawing Lines,” 82 Harvard Law 
Review 63, 64 (1968): 
The lines and distinctions of doctrine tell why cases on either side should be decided 
differently, and promise that future cases will be decided accordingly. The line drawn, 
then, is the symbol of rationality in the judicial process. The line also guides. It guides the 
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sarily be arguing at a significant disadvantage given the force of stare decisis and the re-
liance that other (also absent) parties may already have placed on the prior decision. For 
this very reason, Fuller made the otherwise counterintuitive argument that, the more 
strictly precedents are interpreted, the more problematic adjudication becomes.36 
Though Fuller explicitly conceded that “covert polycentric elements [are] almost 
always present in even the most simple-appearing cases,” he tried to sidestep the problem 
with the usual legal legerdemain. It is, he insisted, “a matter of degree” and, so, a ques-
tion of judgment: “It is a question of knowing when the polycentric elements have be-
come so significant and predominant that the proper limits of adjudication have been 
reached.”37 But Fuller had nothing to say—offering neither principles nor standards—for 
how one might go about making that determination. Nor could he. For the underlying 
problem is inherent the Legal Process understanding of adjudication, as Alexander Bickel 
noted: “The matrix paradox of all paradoxes . . . is . . . that the Court may only decide 
concrete cases and may not pronounce general principles at large; but it may decide a 
constitutional issue only on the basis of general principle.”38 
The second thing to note about the passage discussing the railroad crossing hypo-
thetical is that the polycentric effects of the initial ruling will occur even without further 
litigation. Most interactions in contemporary life, Abram Chayes points out, “are con-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Supreme Court itself, which will often apply it without reconsideration. It guides the 
hundreds of courts that take care that the Court’s law is faithfully executed. 
36 Fuller, supra note 16, at 398. Conversely, he argued that, the more liberal the interpretation of precedents, 
the better the judicial process is able “to absorb these covert polycentric elements” and accommodate “legal 
doctrine to the complex aspects of a problem . . . as these aspects reveal themselves in successive cases.” Id. 
37 Id. at 397-98. 
38 Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 247 (Yale 
Univ. Press, 1962). 
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ducted on a routine or bureaucratized basis.”39 Thus, we can expect (and Fuller’s hypo-
thetical expects) that counsel for the railroad will inform the Board and the CEO of the 
railroad’s potential liability for accidents at other of its crossings. But the downstream 
effects of the first decision will ripple across a variety of professional and industry-wide 
networks. The railroad’s general counsel will surely share the new ruling with other rail-
way lawyers at professional meetings or at a continuing education conferences. (Today, 
there would be a listserv for this very purpose.) This will lead to similar actions or in-
creased litigation as railroads seek to avoid liability at their many railway crossings.  
If polycentricity is unavoidable here, it is inescapable everywhere. Accordingly, 
the idea that adjudication should be limited to only those problems capable of resolution 
by the application of legal principle is both dangerous and delusional. It is dangerous be-
cause, as Fuller says, it will lead to inept and incomplete resolutions of complex problems. 
And it is delusional because, as Chayes explains, polycentric effects cannot be avoided:  
The interests of absentees . . . become more pressing as social and economic acti- 
vity is increasingly organized through large aggregates of people. An order nomi- 
nally addressed to an individual litigant . . . has obvious and visible impact on 
persons not individually before the court. . . . A suit against an individual to col-
lect a tax, if it results in a determination of the constitutional invalidity of the tax-
ing statute, has the same result for absentees as a grant or denial of an injunction. 
Statutory construction . . . may have a similar extended impact, again even if the 
relief is not equitable in form. Officials will almost inevitably act in accordance 
with the judicial interpretation in the countless similar situations cast up by a  
sprawling bureaucratic program.40 
The complexity of adjudication is not some new, twenty-first century phenome-
non. It has been with us at least since the Sherman Act of 1890.41 Chayes identifies a 
variety of cases—including “securities fraud and other aspects of the conduct of corpo-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Abram Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,” 89 Harvard Law Review 1281, 1291 
(1976). 
40 Id. at 1294-95. 
41 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2013). 
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rate business, bankruptcy and reorganizations, union governance, consumer fraud, hous-
ing discrimination, electoral reapportionment, environmental management”—in which 
courts have historically faced complex social issues.42  Yet, surprisingly little of this ex-
perience has penetrated either the conventional understanding of adjudication or how we 
teach procedure in law school (a point I return to below).  
(3) Posner suggests that, when faced with complexity, judges should make greater 
use of their power to appoint experts under Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.43 
This suggestion is constructive; but there is so much more one could say. The federal 
courts have authority under Rule 706 and Rules 23 and 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to marshal quite substantial institutional resources to deal with complexity.44 
There is a large literature on this point,45 of which the Chayes piece is the earliest and still 
among the best.  Chayes, in fact, provides a remarkably accurate account of the capacity 
of the public law litigation to sort through complex social and institutional problems.46 
Chief among its advantages is the ability to tap “energies and resources outside” the judi-
ciary in a non-bureaucratic manner. “It does not work through a rigid, multi-layered hier-
archy of numerous officials, but through a smallish representative task force, assembled 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Chayes, supra note 39, at 1284. 
43 Reflections, supra note 8, at 297-301. 
44 Wayne D. Brazil, “Special Masters In Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or Reshaping Adjudica-
tion?” 53 Univ. of Chicago Law Review 394, 394 (1986) (“Masters can bring significant new skills and 
flexibility to bear on cases whose complexity threatens to overwhelm our traditional system.”).	  
45 For some of the more sympathetic discussions, see Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, “The 
Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation,” 93 Harvard Law Review 465 (1980); Judith 
Resnik, “Managerial Judges,” 96 Harvard Law Review 376 (1982); Susan Strum, “Resolving the Remedial 
Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention in Prisons,” 138 Univ. of Pennsylvania Law Review 805 
(1990). For commentary by some of the important real-world actors, see William Wayne Justice, “The Two 
Faces of Judicial Activism,” 61 George Washington Law Review 1 (1992); Jack B. Weinstein, “Litigation 
Seeking Changes in Public Behavior and Institutions—Some Views on Participation,” 13 Univ. of 
California Davis Law Review 231 (1980); Vincent M. Nathan, “The Use of Masters in Institutional Reform 
Litigation,” 10 Toledo Law Review 419 (1979); Curtis J. Berger, “Away From the Courthouse and Into the 
Field: The Odyssey of a Special Master,” 78 Columbia Law Review 707 (1978). See generally ABA 
Section on Litigation, 1985 National Institute on New Techniques for Resolving Complex Litigation. 
46 Chayes, supra note 39, at 1296-1302. 
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ad hoc, and easily dismantled when the problem is finally resolved.”47 
Chayes observes that many of the Court’s decisions on standing, the availability 
of equitable relief, and class actions can be understood as an attempt to rein in these more 
systemic forms of adjudication.48 But it may also be true that the Court’s antipathy to 
these cases reflects a fear of complexity. Writing in the same period as Chayes, Joseph 
Vining suggested that the Court’s decisions on standing represented a more deep-seated 
defense mechanism. “[H]ow like the octopus,” Vining observed, “the legal mind is when 
constructing cases.” 
Inside the self-constructed home everything does not depend on everything else 
and entities do not dissolve conceptually into some other entity or some larger 
unity. The court can swim out into the great sea around and dart back when 
frightened by its dark vastness. . . . Fear may make it too difficult to admit, ex-
cept by allusion, that one is swimming in the sea and that one’s behavior is a re-
action to it. Denial is a normal defense of the human mind against great fear; the 
legal mind is not peculiar in this regard.49 
Thirty-five years later, Posner makes the quite similar claim that the increased formalism 
of the last two decades represents a flight from complexity.50 Plus ça change, plus c’est 
la même chose. 
 Recently, the federal district court judge who served as chief mediator in the 
Detroit bankruptcy case spoke to our Faculty about his experiences. He talked about the 
chronology of the case and discussed some of the more public aspects of the negotiation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Id. at 1308-09. 
48 See id. at 1304-05: 
From one perspective, the Burger Court may be seen to be embarked on some such pro-
gram for the restoration of the traditional forms of adjudication. Its decisions on standing, 
class actions, and public interest attorneys’ fees, among others, achieve a certain coher-
ence in this light. . . . One suspects that at bottom its procedural stance betokens a lack of 
sympathy with the substantive results and with the idea of the district courts as a vehicle 
of social and economic reform. The Court’s distaste for reformist outcomes is barely veil-
ed. . . in two recent cases, Warth v. Seldin, [422 U.S. 490 (1975)], challenging exclusion-
ary zoning in the suburbs of Rochester, and Rizzo v. Goode, [423 U.S. 362 (1976)], 
attacking police brutality in the city of Philadelphia. 
49 Joseph Vining, Legal Identity: The Coming of Age of Public Law 94 & n.* (Yale Univ. Press, 1978). 
50 Reflections, supra note 8, at 8.	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He noted the 1967 riots and the collapse of the public school system as two of the social 
phenomenon leading to the hollowing out of the city, the loss of the tax base, and the 
current fiscal sinkhole. I asked the last question. “You are working in a different capacity 
as a mediator in this large structural reorganization context. What are you learning there 
that you might take back with you when you return to the bench to hear regular Article III 
cases?” 
“That’s a good question,” he replied. “Absolutely nothing. When I sit as a judge I 
just apply the law. Nothing more.”51 He elaborated, more-or-less following Fuller, that 
when judges do anything else they lose legitimacy. 
I followed up privately afterwards. “You went traditionalist on me real fast. Isn’t 
there more to it than that?” I continued: “The excess doesn’t go away. If, but for cases 
like Rizzo v. Goode,52 the federal courts had dealt with the problem of police violence, the 
Detroit riots might never had happened. If but for Milliken,53 the courts had dealt with the 
racial isolation in the Detroit schools, DPS would not look like it does now.” He re-
sponded with a disquisition on the limited role of federal courts in a democracy. “People 
vote for their representatives to deal with these kind of issues,” he said. “Courts shouldn’t 
interfere; they should leave it to the representative democratic process.” 
 “But,” I pointed out, “you are dealing with all of the extended the consequences 
and ramifications of those problems in federal bankruptcy right now. And that will have 
to be approved by an Article III court. When you are negotiating away the pensions and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Cf. Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 78–81 (Harvard University Press, 2008) (“Neither [Roberts] 
nor any other knowledgeable person actually believed or believes that the rules that judges in our system 
apply . . . are given to them the way that the rules of baseball are given to umpires.”). 
52 423 U.S. 362 (1976). 
53 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (disallowing busing across district lines among the 53 school 
districts in the metropolitan Detroit area).  
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futures of all those retirees, who represents them then?” 
“You have a point,” he replied.   
The point, at the risk of belaboring the obvious, it that the federal courts often 
plead that they are unsuitable or inappropriate fora for dealing with complex societal 
problems. But, when the downstream social consequences come to them in highly com-
plex, polycentric forms such as bankruptcy, they proceed unreflectively without regard to 
democratic political process and without the least concern either for their capacity to 
handle complexity or for the ability of all those affected to participate through reasoned 
arguments and proofs.54 
We can do better.  
Ultimately, responsibility lies with the law schools, which fail to train lawyers to 
deal with complexity. Casebooks still concentrate on the enunciation of doctrine in appel-
late opinions and, outside the use of economics and rational choice theory in some of the 
standard law school courses (which, I assume, mostly takes place at elite law schools be-
cause I haven’t seen much of it at the schools where I have taught), there is very little in 
the curriculum that equips students to think systematically about complex social prob-
lems. Seventy years ago, Lasswell and MacDougal argued that legal education should 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 To drive the point home, consider that the mediator initiated the so-called “grand bargain” in which the 
quite remarkable collection of the Detroit Institute of Arts, which is owned by the City, would not be in-
cluded among Detroit’s assets. The consideration for this was a pledge of approximately $661 million from 
foundations, the State of Michigan, and the DIA itself that will be used to reduce cuts faced by pensioners. 
Nathan Bomey & Matt Helms, “Detroit Pensioners Back Grand Bargain in Bankruptcy Vote, Creditors 
Object,” Detroit Free Press, July 22, 2014. Many Detroiters think that the DIA’s full value should have 
been available to offset the drastic cuts to city services that will inevitably ensue as a result of the 
bankruptcy reorganization. Others think that the DIA is an incalculable and irreplaceable civic resource that 
can help anchor Detroit’s revival. I happen to be in the latter category. Still, this policy decision was not 
made by the people’s representatives through the ordinary democratic process; it was designed and 
effectuated by a life-tenured federal judge—this same federal judge—serving at the request of the bank-
ruptcy judge to whom he had assigned the case. 
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train students to deal with policy questions in a coherent and sophisticated manner.55 I am 
familiar with only one casebook that seriously aspires to this goal, Mark Tushnet’s and 
Liza Heinzerling’s superb Regulatory State book.56 Not only does their book canvas a 
broad array of secondary material from a range of disciplines and theoretical perspectives, 
but it provides students with a variety of conceptual tools with which to think about com-
plex legal, policy, and doctrinal issues in a systematic and sophisticated way. In the area 
of procedure, Cover, Fiss, and Resnik’s Procedure and its successors are the most 
thoughtful efforts to treat the area with the depth and systematicity that it requires.57 (Not 
coincidentally, all of these books include an excerpt from Fuller; though Heinzerling & 
Tushnet fails to include Chayes.) 
To be frank, I cannot see how we can train lawyers for the 21st Century without 
equipping them to face complexity by teaching them to think about legal and social prob-
lems in systems-theoretic terms. In addition to Fuller, Chayes, Coase, Calabresi, and 
Posner, every student should be reading Hohfeld,58 Hale,59 Llewellyn,60 Tussman and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, “Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in 
the Public Interest,” 52 Yale Law Journal 203 (1943). See also Roberto Mangabeira Unger, What Should 
Legal Analysis Become? (Verso, 1996). 
56 Lisa Heinzerling & Mark V. Tushnet, The Regulatory and Administrative State: Materials, Cases, Com-
ments (Oxford Univ. Press, 2006). Not by accident, the book includes two particularly thoughtful and in-
structive dissents by Judge Posner in DePass v. United States, 721 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1983), and United 
States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990). 
57 Robert M. Cover, Owen M. Fiss & Judith Resnik, Procedure (Foundation Press, 1988); Owen M. Fiss & 
Judith Resnik, Adjudication and Its Alternatives: An Introduction to Procedure (Foundation Press, 2003). 
The book co-authored by Dean Minow preserves many of the elements of the Cover, Fiss, and Resnik 
materials. See Stephen N. Subrin, Martha L. Minow, Mark S. Brodin, Thomas O. Main, & Alexandra D. 
Lahav, Civil Procedure: Doctrine, Practice, and Context (Wolters, Kluwer, 4th ed. 2012). 
58 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,” 
23 Yale Law Journal 16 (1913). 
59 Robert Hale, “Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State,” 38 Political Science 
Quarterly 470 (1923). 
60 Particularly Karl N. Llewellyn, “The Constitution as an Institution,” 34 Columbia Law Review 1 (1934), 
and “Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be 
Construed,” 3 Vanderbilt Law Review 395 (1950).  
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tenBroek,61	  Michelman,62 and Radin63 (among others) as exemplars of how to think in a 
systematic and sophisticated way about legal problems. (Not coincidentally, Heinzerling 
& Tushnet includes excerpts from three of this latter group.) Posner advocates that law 
students be required to take courses in statistics and in at least one technical field else-
where in the university such as mathematics, economics, psychology, engineering, or 
environmental science.64 While I wholeheartedly agree with this suggestion, I think that 
primary responsibility lies with law faculties and that we need to change how we teach 
law both in the first year and across the curriculum. 
Posner proposes that we make room in the curriculum for this additional training 
by cutting or shortening Constitutional Law: “Dominated as it is by the most political 
court in the land, constitutional law occupies far too large a role in legal education.”65 But, 
constitutional law is probably the one area of law most in need of a revamped pedagogy 
that emphasizes the complexity of legal issues and the need to build systematically on the 
past. I take up this point in the remainder of these comments. 
Posner devotes just a single page to the mess that the Court has made in the elec-
tion area, pointing out the naïveté of its approach to the effects of campaign finance on 
the electoral process and decrying the Court’s tolerance both of political gerrymandering 
and of voter suppression by means of photo ID requirements.66 The latter comment has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek, “The Equal Protection of the Laws,” 37 California Law Review 
341 (1949). 
62 Frank I. Michelman, “Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of ‘Just 
Compensation’ Law,” 80 Harvard Law Review 1165 (1967). 
63 Margaret Jane Radin, “Market Inalienability,” 100 Harvard Law Review 1849 (1987). 
64 Reflections, supra note 8, at 347.	  
65 Id. at 347-48.	  
66 Id. at 84-85 (discussing Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) and 
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008)). The principal cases on the political 
gerrymander (or, more accurately, overlooking the political gerrymander) are Vieth v. Jublier,	  541 U.S. 267 
(2004), and League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U. S. 399 (2006). 
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garnered the lion’s share of attention, which is understandable considering that Posner 
wrote the opinion for the court below. But, it might not have drawn all the attention had 
Posner spent more time analyzing the complexities of each of these areas and shown how 
these cases should have come out differently. And there is much that could have been dis-
cussed. Modern campaigns increasingly involve highly sophisticated computer-generated 
strategies in targeting and mobilizing voters.67 Similarly, redistricting can now be done 
by advanced computer programs capable of pinpointing the party affiliations and voting 
histories of individuals—not just household-by-household, but within each household—
and drawing the lines accordingly.68 Both the complexities of campaign finance and its 
effects on our politics—not least of which is the inordinate amount of time that politi-
cians must spend fundraising rather than governing and the concomitant dependencies 
that engenders—raise problems not accounted for by the Court’s simplistic equation of 
money with speech. And, given the dynamics of mass culture and the shrewd disinfor-
mation campaigns made possible by today’s technology,69 the Court’s confident assump-
tion that unlimited campaign spending by corporations will be a positive source of infor-
mation for voters doesn’t even pass the straight-face test.70 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 A good introductory primer is Robert Draper, “Can the Republicans Be Saved from Obsolescence,” The 
New York Times Magazine, February 14, 2013, MM 14. 
68 “Gerrymandering is not hard. The core technique is to jam voters likely to favor your opponents into a 
few throwaway districts where the other side will win lopsided victories. . . . Professionals use proprietary 
software to draw districts, but free software like Dave’s Redistricting App lets you do it from your couch.” 
Sam Wang, “The Great Gerrymander of 2012,” The New York Times, February 3, 2013, Opinion: p.1. Quite 
possibly, computer models might also help crack the judicially manageably standards problem raised in 
Vieth. Id. (“Using statistical tools that are common in . . . neuroscience, I have found strong evidence that 
this historic aberration arises from partisan disenfranchisement. . . . we need to adopt a statistically robust 
judicial standard for partisan gerrymandering.”). 
69 See, e.g., Justin Gillis, “Scientists Sound Alarm on Climate,” The New York Times, March 18, 2014, D1 
(“Global warming has been much harder to understand, not least because of a disinformation campaign 
financed by elements of the fossil-fuel industry.”). 
70 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364 (“On certain topics corporations may possess valuable expertise, leaving 
them the best equipped to point out errors or fallacies in speech of all sorts, including the speech of 
candidates and elected officials.”). See Steven L. Winter, “Citizens Disunited,” 27 Georgia State Univ. Law 
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But worse than this naïveté (if it is naïveté and not studied indifference) is the 
Court’s recent resurrection of a long-ago discredited libertarian logic that comes straight 
out of the Lochner Era playbook. Consider two examples: 
(1) In Privileges of Labor Unions in the Struggle for Life,71 Walter Wheeler Cook 
applied Hohfeld’s scheme of fundamental jural relations to critique the decision in Hitch-
man Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell.72 In Hitchman Coal, the Court held that an employer 
whose employment contract specified that no worker could belong to the United Mine 
Workers was entitled to an injunction against attempts to induce its workers to leave its 
employ and join the union. This was so even though the Court recognized both that “the 
working man is [as] free to join the union” as the “employer is free to make non-mem-
bership in a union a condition of employment” and that “the employment was ‘at will,’ 
and terminable by either party at any time.”73 Cook pointed out that the employer’s privi-
lege to insist on non-union hires cannot be converted into a right to exclude others—in-
cluding the at will employee himself—from deciding that they would rather join the 
union than work for the Hitchman Coal Company.74 Nor can that privilege credibly be 
conflated with a duty on the part of the government to enforce by injunction the mutually 
terminable contract of employment once the worker has decided to exercise his privilege 
to change his mind. In short, the Court held that the “right” to insist on hiring only non-
union workers also encompassed a right to force them to continue as employees even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Review 1133, 1135 (2011) (“while the Court’s opinion in Citizens United is long on free speech rhetoric, it 
is painfully short on empirical data, social context, and constitutional vision”). 
71 Walter Wheeler Cook, “Privileges of Labor Unions in the Struggle for Life,” 27 Yale Law Journal 779 
(1918). 
72 245 U.S. 229 (1917). 
73 Id. at 251. 
74 Cook, supra note 71, at 789-90 (“[I]t it is at once obvious that the right (claim) to protection of the re-
sulting “status” [as an non-unionized employee] is a different thing from the privilege to enter into the 
relations giving rise to the (so-called) “status.”) (emphasis in original). 
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after they had a change of heart. 
In Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,75 the Court 
struck down a law that provided matching funds to a publicly-financed candidate when a 
privately-financed candidate exceeded preset spending amounts. The Court found that the 
provision of matching funds was a “penalty” that “burdened” the free speech rights of the 
privately-financed candidate. It explained that 
the more money spent on that candidate’s behalf or in opposition to a publicly 
funded candidate, the more money the publicly funded candidate receives from 
the State. And just as with the privately financed candidate, the effect of a dollar 
spent on election speech is a guaranteed financial payout to the publicly funded 
candidate the group opposes.76  
But, of course, that is the very point of a matching funds scheme—to promote debate by 
leveling the playing field so that the publicly-funded candidate can respond to privately-
funded speech. This can only be construed as a “penalty” if the legal privilege to spend 
money on one’s election speech entails not just that the government has no-right to forbid 
it, but also a correlative duty on the government not to assist others.77 To put it another 
way, the Bennett Court converted a privilege of wealth (to spend as much as you want on 
a campaign) into an enforceable right to outspend others.78 
(2) Written during the heyday of laissez faire, Hale’s Coercion and Distribution 
in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State argued that it made no sense to speak of government 
“interference” with property rights because the government is an active participant in es-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 564 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). 
76 131 S.Ct. at 2818-20. 
77 Although not on all fours, much the same can be said about Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. ___, 134 
S.Ct. 2751 (2014). There, the employer’s free exercise right against government interference became an 
immunity that imposed an affirmative liability on the government and a power that inflicted a disability on 
employees with different views with respect to birth control. 
78 In more colloquial terms, the Court held that rich people have the right not only to spend all the money 
they want on election campaigns, but also the right to the relative advantage that their greater wealth 
provides and that the State cannot interfere with either of these prerogatives.	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tablishing, promoting, and maintaining the system of property rights.79 By the same token, 
the payment an employer makes to his or her workers is not “voluntary” because it is the 
necessary cost of obtaining the service that they could otherwise withhold.80 He explain-
ed that, while ordinary language users might continue to use terms such as “interference” 
and “coercion” in their unreflective senses, it makes little sense to predicate policy on 
those intuitions because the sense that something counts as “interference” or as “coercion” 
depends entirely upon the circular bit of reasoning that the behavior is legally or morally 
forbidden.81 It follows that it makes no sense to distinguish between acts and omissions. 
“If I start an automobile in motion [and] subsequently . . . fail to perform the act of stop-
ping it when ‘reasonable care’ would require me to do so, the victim of my failure to act 
can recover damages for my nonperformance.”82 Nor, he pointed out, would it matter if I 
bargained with the victim in advance to pay me to exercise due care when driving (a pre-
Coase example of a Coasean bargain). My failure to act would, from a legal and econo-
mic point of view, be the “act” of breach of contract. But, from a lay point of view, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 See Hale, supra note 59, at 471 (“What is the government doing when it “protects a property right”? 
Passively, it is abstaining from interference with the owner when he deals with the thing owned; actively, it 
is forcing the non-owner to desist from handling it, unless the owner consents.”). 
80 Id. at 474 (“But whatever they get beyond this [subsistence] minimum is obtained . . . by his fear that 
they will exercise the threat to work elsewhere or not at all. If obtained through this fear, it is a case where 
he submits by so much to their wills. It is not a ‘voluntary’ payment, but a payment as the price of escape 
from damaging behavior of others.”). Note that the logic here is identical to that of Coase, supra note 11, 
with respect to injury and injuring behavior as mutual inflictions of costs.  
81 Hale, supra note 59, at 476:  
If an act is called “coercion” when, and only when, one submits to demands in order 
to prevent another from violating a legal duty, then every legal system by very definition 
forbids the private exercise of coercion—it is not coercion unless the law does forbid it. 
And no action which the law forbids, and which could be used as a means of influencing 
another, can fail to be coercion—again by definition. . . . And if an act is called “coercion” 
when, and only when, one submits to demands in order to prevent another from violating 
a moral duty, we get right back to the use of the term to express our conclusion as to the 
justifiability of the use of the pressure in question; with the ensuing circular reasoning of 
condemning an act because we have already designated it “coercive.” 
82 Id. at 475. A formalist might respond that the duty of care arises from the act of driving the car. But a 
realist or economist would respond that both characterizations—i.e., the “action” of operating the car or the 
“inaction” of failing to apply the brakes—are descriptively true. Standing alone, neither explains why 
liability should attach. 
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bargain itself would be considered “coercive” because premised on a threat to fail to per-
form a legally or morally required act.83 
Applying quite similar logic, Roscoe Pound argued against the act/omission dis-
tinction in tort law. Modern law begins by forbidding culpable acts of aggression; but, in 
a complex society, one must be able to conduct one’s affairs without fear of harm: 
The savage must move stealthily, avoid the sky line, and go armed. The civilized 
man assumes that no one will attack him and so moves among his fellow men 
openly and unarmed, going about his business in a minute division of labor. 
Otherwise there could be no division of labor beyond the differentiation of men 
of fighting age, as we see in primitive society. . . . Just as we may not go effec-
tively about on a minute division of labor if we must constantly be on guard 
against the aggressions or the want of forethought of our neighbor, so our com-
plex social order based on division of labor may not function effectively if each 
of us must stay his activities through fear of [certain forms of inaction]. There is 
danger to the general security not only in what men do and the way in which they 
do it, but also in what they fail to do. . . .84 
In other words, Pound argued that complex social systems require the stability of a gene-
ral expectation of freedom from harm regardless of its source in action or inaction. The 
relevant question is only one of effect, and its determination turns on questions of policy 
rather than on a formal or metaphysical distinctions. 
 Which makes it all the more surprising to learn—nearly a hundred years later—
that the Framers had secretly written the act/omission distinction into the Constitution. In 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sibelius, Chief Justice Roberts explained 
that: “To an economist, perhaps, there is no difference between activity and inactivity; both 
have measurable economic effects on commerce. But the distinction between doing some-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Id. at 476: 
But even were the fact recognized that payment were demanded as the price of not ab-
staining, . . . the demands would still be called threats. The reason . . . is partly because to 
abstain is contrary to legal duty, partly because it is adjudged to be contrary to moral duty. 
Popular speech in this case seems to apply the term coercion to demands made as a price 
of not violating a legal or moral duty.	  
84 Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law 85-88 (Yale Univ. Press, 1922) (originally de-
livered as the Storrs Lecture in 1921). 
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thing and doing nothing would not have been lost on the Framers, who were ‘practical states-
men,’ not metaphysical philosophers.”85 
Note three things about this statement. First, it deconstructs itself: The Framers 
were practical men, not metaphysicians; accordingly, they would have been more con-
cerned with the action/inaction distinction than with the practical economic effects of the 
relevant behavior. Second, the “practical statesmen” characterization in the Chief’s state-
ment is a quote from a 1905 Supreme Court opinion86—that is, from the very year Loch-
ner was decided,87 almost two decades before Hale and Pound wrote and nearly four de-
cades before the decision in Wickard v. Filburn.88 Third, the statement is in direct conflict 
both with precedent and with any rational understanding of economics. As the Court ob-
served in Wickard: “Once an economic measure of the reach of the power granted to 
Congress in the Commerce Clause is accepted, questions of federal power cannot be de-
cided simply by finding the activity in question to be ‘production,’ nor can consideration 
of its economic effects be foreclosed by calling them ‘indirect.’”89 Was Filburn’s cultiva-
tion of wheat in excess of the quota “action” or “inaction”? In one sense, it was action—
i.e., the forbidden planting and harvesting of wheat. From another perspective, it was in-
action—i.e., a failure to go into the market to buy wheat.90  Did Filburn’s cultivation of 
wheat for home use represent a decrease in the demand (thus, depressing prices) or an in-
crease in the supply of wheat available for consumption (thus, depressing prices)? The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85  National Federation of Independent Business v. Sibelius, 567 U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2589 (2012) 
(Opinion of Roberts, C.J.); see also id. at 2468 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting) (“Ultimately the 
dissent is driven to saying that there is really no difference between action and inaction, . . . a proposition 
that has never recommended itself, neither to the law nor to common sense.”). 
86 Sibelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2589 (quoting South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 449 (1905)).	  
87 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
88 317 US 111 (1942). 
89 Id. at 124. 
90 Thus, the Wickard Court described the statute as “forcing some farmers into the market to buy what they 
could provide for themselves.” Id. at 129. 
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answer to each of these questions is “both” and “it doesn’t matter because the effect is 
precisely the same.”  
Finally, consider briefly the so-called “new” originalism. Its academic propo-
nents claim that it differs from the “old” originalism because it answers the criticisms of 
originalism as articulated in influential articles by Paul Brest91 and H. Jefferson Powell92 
by: (1) focusing not on the original intent of the Framers, but on the original public mean-
ing of the text as it would have been understood by those who voted to ratify the Consti-
tution; and (2) by distinguishing constitutional interpretation—that is, determination of 
the semantic meaning of the words of the text—from constitutional construction—that is, 
decision regarding the legal effect of the text as it is to be applied to new circumstance 
not anticipated by the ratifiers.93 
Perhaps it is just me, but I fail to see anything “new” in this version of originalism. 
Consider the latter claim: What is the difference between the interpretation and con-
struction distinction and Sanford Kadish’s distinction between the “intension” and “ex-
tension” of a constitutional provision?94 For that matter, what is new about the distinction 
between originalism and the so-called “Living Constitution” and Kadish’s distinction be-
tween fixity and flexibility in constitutional meaning?95 So, too, with respect to the shift 
from original intent to public meaning: The idea that the Constitution should be under-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Paul Brest, “The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,” 60 Boston University Law Review 
204 (1980).	  
92 H. Jefferson Powell, “The Original Understanding of Original Intent,” 98 Harvard Law Review 885 
(1985). 
93 See Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial 
Review (Univ. of Kansas Press, 1999); Randy E. Barnett, Restoring The Lost Constitution: The Presump-
tion of Liberty (Princeton Univ. Press, 2004); Robert W. Bennett & Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional 
Originalism: A Debate (Cornell Univ. Press, 2011); 	  
94 Sanford Kadish, “Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication — A Survey and Criticism,” 66 
Yale Law Journal 319, 341-42 (1957). 
95 Id. at 334-44. 
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stood according to the ordinary meaning of the words as the ratifying public would have 
understood them was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Mary-
land,96 and can be found in subsequent opinions.97 In any event, this shift of semantic 
focus resolves none of the critiques of originalism. Thus, Brest quoted Quinten Skinner in 
warning of the difficulties of ascertaining the meaning of something written centuries 
ago: 
We must classify in order to understand, and we can only classify the unfamiliar 
in terms of the familiar. The perpetual danger, in our attempts to enlarge our 
historical understanding, is thus that our expectations about what someone must 
be saying or doing will themselves determine that we understand the agent to be 
doing something which he would not—or even could not—himself have accepted 
as an account of what he was doing.98 
Nothing in the shift from Framers’ intent to original public meaning responds to or obvi-
ates this interpretive problem. So, too, nothing in the shift from intent to public meaning 
resolves the problem first noted by Chief Justice Marshall that all words have both broad 
and narrow meanings.99 “New” originalists, no less than the older variety, have a strong 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819) (“A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its 
great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake 
of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably 
never be understood by the public.”). 
97 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 453 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (“the whole 
aim of construction, as applied to a provision of the Constitution, is . . . to ascertain and give effect to the 
intent of its framers and the people who adopted it.”) (emphasis added). 
98 Brest, supra note 91, at 216 (quoting Quinten Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of 
Ideas,” 8 History & Theory 3, 6 (1969)). In terms of contemporary linguistics, this problem arises from the 
role of framing in constructing semantic meaning. See Steven L. Winter, “Frame Semantics and the ‘Inter-
nal Point of View,’” in Current Legal Issues Colloquium: Law and Language 115 (Oxford Univ. Press, 
Michael Freeman & Fiona Smith eds., 2013). 
99 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 414 (“Such is the character of human language, that no word conveys to the mind, 
in all situations, one single definite idea; and nothing is more common than to use words in a figurative 
sense.”). For a more extensive treatment of the issue in light of contemporary linguistics, see my A Clear-
ing in the Forest: Law, Life, and Mind (Univ. of Chicago Press, 2001). The basic problem with Barnett’s 
methodology is twofold: First, as others have noted, he assumes that it is only the narrow meaning that 
counts. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, “Essay: A Critique of the Narrow Interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause,” 96 Northwestern Univ. Law Review 695 (2002). Second, he does not understand that when 
one searches the contemporaneous uses of a term, one is going to find that in the vast majority of the cases it is 
used in its prototypical sense—well, because that is the import of the empirically documented phenomenon of 
prototype effects—but that this says nothing about the range of meanings that an ordinary language speaker 
would naturally understand the term to connote. Prototype effects work better as touchstones for inclusion than 
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tendency to find what they want to see both when they review the historical record and 
when they assess semantic meaning—as, for example, the scope of the term “regulate.”100 
Thus, Randy Barnett maintains “that the term ‘commerce’ was consistently used in the 
narrow sense and that there is no surviving example of it being used in either source in 
any broader sense.”101 He concludes, therefore, that Justice Thomas was essentially cor-
rect when he argued in that “the term ‘commerce’ was used in contradistinction to produc-
tive activities such as manufacturing and agriculture. Alexander Hamilton, for example, 
repeatedly treated commerce, agriculture, and manufacturing as three separate endeavors.”102 
(Though one might ask: Does the fact that he repeatedly used the three terms together in a 
single phrase indicate that he thought they were three things or one set of integrally related 
things?) Barnett goes further, alleging that in “none of the sixty-three appearances of the term 
‘commerce’ in The Federalist Papers” did Hamilton ever use the term “to unambiguously 
refer to any activity beyond trade or exchange.”103 He notes Hamilton’s rhetorical question in 
Federalist 35: “Will not the merchant understand and be disposed to cultivate, as far as may 
be proper, the interests of the mechanic and manufacturing arts to which his commerce is so 
nearly allied?”104 But he does not note that, on the immediately preceding page, Hamilton 
argued more directly that “discerning citizens are well aware that the mechanic and manu-
facturing arts furnish the materials of mercantile enterprise and industry” and that, therefore, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
as rules of exclusion. Standing alone, the fact that a car is certainly a “vehicle” covered by a rule prohibiting 
vehicles in the park tells us little about how we should handle a bicycle, a moped, or a child’s electric automobile.  
See Clearing in the Forest, supra, at 70-92, 197-204. 
100 Compare Sibelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2589 (“The Framers gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to 
compel it”) with Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128 (“The stimulation of commerce is a use of the regulatory function 
quite as definitely as prohibitions or restrictions thereon.”); and with United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 
113 (1942) (“the prohibition of such shipment by Congress is indubitably a regulation of the commerce.”). 
101 Randy E. Barnett, “The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause,” 68 Univ. of Chicago Law Review 101, 
103 (2001). 
102 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
103 Barnett, supra note 101, at 115. 
104 Id. at 116. 
	   27	  
“[m]any of them indeed are immediately connected with the operation of commerce.”105 Per-
haps more on point is Hamilton’s statement on the very first page of his famous 1791 
Report on the Subject of Manufactures, where he quite plainly included manufacturing as 
a subset of commerce: 
The expediency of encouraging manufactures in the United States, which was 
not long since deemed very questionable, appears at this time to be pretty gene-
rally admitted. The harassments, which have obstructed the progress of our exter-
nal trade, have led to serious reflections on the necessity of enlarging the sphere 
of our domestic commerce. . . .106  
We might say in conclusion that the second corollary of Santayana’s famous dic-










 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Alexander Hamilton, “The Federalist No. 35” in Writings 318 (Library of America, Joanne B. Freeman 
ed., 2001). In No. 35, Hamilton is not discussing the scope of the Commerce Clause, but the representation 
of different classes of interests in the national government; his point is that the interests of the manufac-
turing class will be represented by representatives of the merchant class because their interests are so 
closely connected. 
106 Alexander Hamilton, “Report on the Subject of Manufactures” in id. at 647.  
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